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ABSTRACT
Private participation in the provision of public services is often promoted as a
means to reducing production costs in the public sector. In this study, I test this result using
a twelve-year panel dataset of 343 public school districts in Minnesota. The voting behavior
of residents in the state‟s House elections and school districts‟ prior experience with
contractors are used as instruments to control for the endogenous decision to outsource. The
first stage results from fixed-effects two stage least squares (2SLS) regression show that the
two instruments, population density and the number of school days increase the likelihood
of outsourcing while wages have a negative effect. The second stage results, from the fixedeffects 2SLS regression show that the use of private contractors increases total
transportation costs by 21 percent, a much greater effect than when the endogenous
decision to outsource is ignored. However, as a share of total expenditure, outsourcing
increases the ratio by about 2 percent; thus showing evidence of the cost burden that
outsourcing imposes on school finances. The much smaller effect here however, may
explain why school districts continue to use contractors despite the overwhelming empirical
evidence against outsourcing.
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1.0

INTRODUCTION

School boards across the United States are saddled with the question of how to
perform their various duties cheaply without compromising on quality. School districts
must decide whether to provide a certain service using employees in-house, from outside
sources, or some combination of the two thereof. Outsourcing is the “contracting out” of a
service traditionally delivered by public employees. The desire to save costs has been
identified throughout the existing literature as one of the major reasons for outsourcing
(Kremic et al., 2006; O‟Toole and Meier, 2004; Arnold, 2000; Willcocks et al., 1995; and
Farris, 1986). Cost savings are possible because outsourcing combines the competitive
pressures of private sector with the coordination, scale economies, and social goals of
public provision (Warner, 2001). In the K-12 education sector, outsourcing often involves
using private sector contractors to provide support services (pupil transportation, food
services, and custodial services); although Rho (2013) finds evidence of outsourcing the
core function of pupil instruction in some school districts in Texas.
The use of competitive outsourcing to auction the right to supply some specified
service(s) or good reduces the contractor's bargaining power when there is a sufficient
supply of contractors (Lyons and Sekkat, 1991).

This means if there is a competitive

supply of contractors then a school district‟s payments to the contractor with the winning
bid will be less than payments to losing bidders. School districts that outsource also gain by
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concentrating on their core mission of providing instructional activities while contractors
concentrate on moving pupils to and from school. The likelihood of cost savings is further
enhanced by the fact that a contractor can provide services to neighboring districts thereby
lowering cost through economies of scale (Kremic et al., 2006; Roberts, 2001). These costs
savings can then be shared between the contractor and the school districts. In general, the
theoretical literature supports the use of outsourcing as a cost-saving device (Bajari and
Tadelis 1999), but the empirical evidence from the pupil transportation industry (as in
others) has been mixed. For instance, Thompson (2011), Lazarus and McCullough (2005),
Hutchinson and Pratt (2007), Cassell (2000), Hutchinson and Pratt (1999), Alspaugh
(1996), and Harding (1990) find that outsourcing increases pupil transportation costs. On
the other hand, Bails (1979, McGuire and van Cott (1984), Ross (1988) and Damask (2000)
find that outsourcing leads to costs savings.
Several reasons may explain the mixed results. One of the main reasons for the
conflicting empirical results may be because of the different definitions of the outsourcing
variable in the empirical literature. The most popular measure is a dummy variable set
equal to one if a district engages a contractor and zero otherwise. Outsourcing has also
been defined as a ratio of the number of buses operated by a district to the number operated
by a contractor (Thompson, 2011). In studies on public transit in the United States, the
outsourcing variable is sometimes defined as a set of three dummy variables: fulloutsourcing, partial-outsourcing, and in-house. Each dummy is set equal to one, depending
on the outsourcing decision of the public transit managers. Per this trichonomous definition
of the outsourcing variable, Iseki (2010) finds that partial-outsourcing reduces costs while
full-outsourcing and in-house service provision increases costs. Each of these definitions of
2

the outsourcing variable has its advantages, but as will be demonstrated later in this paper,
their shortcomings may not make them applicable to the pupil transportation industry and
the task of measuring the causal effect of outsourcing on costs. An alternative measure is
thus proposed in this study: a dummy variable that assumes the value one if a school
provides all of its to-and-from-school transportation service using outside sources, and zero
otherwise.
One of the main reasons for the mixed results is due to fact that all of the studies
reviewed here have relied on different types of data. The majority of studies have relied on
a single school-year of data. As noted by Duflo and Kremer (2005), the evaluation of the
effectiveness of social intervention policies using a cross-sectional sample typically suffers
from the fact that those who receive treatment may be different from those who do not.
Unfortunately, this is the situation of most studies in the pupil transportation industry. The
main limitation is often the absence of data prior to the adoption of outsourcing. This often
means that the researcher has to rely on data that have become available after the adoption
of outsourcing as a policy stance. Under such circumstances, the estimated cost difference
between contractor-operated services and in-house services may not necessarily reflect the
true effect of the adoption of outsourcing on costs. The difference may simply be due time
invariant factors such as the physical size of the school district, and unsystematic events
such as unusually harsh weather conditions or high gas price. It may as well be due to the
impact of the program. Hence, there is a need to disentangle these two effects. Besides,
contractors generally lower their bids to win contracts but increase their bids over time as
they build relationships. Thus, a study using a year or a few years of observations may not
capture this trend. This study addresses the data issues by using a twelve-year long panel
3

dataset. The dataset also has information on pre- and post-outsourcing data and thus the
ability to estimate the ceteris paribus effect of outsourcing on costs.
Another reason for the different results is the measure of costs used in these
previous studies. Some studies have used total costs as the dependent variable. Others have
used average costs such as per pupil costs, cost per mile, cost per square miles, cost per
bus, and cost per bus per mile, among others. All these measures may help tell a different
story about the impact of outsourcing on costs. For instance, while outsourcing may
increase costs, measures such as cost per mile may indicate that outsourcing reduces costs
if the contractor records a relatively higher growth in miles than in costs. Using cost per
mile may therefore indicate that a school district is seeing a reduction in costs when the
opposite is true. It is worthy of note that what matters to school districts as far as pupil
transportation is concerned, include the safety of all pupils transported, timeliness of the
service and the costs of transporting pupils to and from school1 . Thus, the measures of costs
explored in this study are total costs and cost per pupil transported. The study also uses
population density at the county level as a proxy for travel time and idling time of school
buses; which have cost implications.
A major challenge in empirical studies on the impact of outsourcing on costs
remains dealing with the endogenous nature of the outsourcing decision. The outsourcing
decision is often treated as a random assignment in empirical work. However this is not the
case in reality. This is because districts that outsource may differ in a number of ways from

1

These were contained a survey report conducted on behalf of the state House of Representatives in 2013 ,
“A Legislative Study of Student Transportation”
Available at http://www.mn.gov/admin/images/Study_Student_Transportation.pdf
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those that produce in-house. Failing to address the endogeneity of the decision to outsource
may bias the results in a study. The bias, although may be reduced by controlling for
observable school characteristics, the possibility of bias remains from unobserved variables
that determine the production choice (that is, through a contractor or using in-house
capacity) such as the school board‟s ability, motivation for costs control or some other
characteristic of a school boards‟ background. For example, higher unobserved motivation
for cost control among outsourcing districts can erroneously lead to the conclusion that
outsourcing reduces costs relative to districts producing in-house even if there is no
difference in the underlying cost structure between these districts. To deal with this source
of endogeneity the study includes a measure of a school‟s district managerial ability2 . A
second source of endogeneity is the reverse causality that arises from the fact that a school
district‟s decision to produce in-house or outsource may depend on the expected level of
pupil transportation costs as much as it‟s observed costs depends on the decision to
outsource. How much of the service being outsourced can greatly influence costs. For
service that may involve the use of assets very specific to the industry, too little
outsourcing may mean the outsourcing agency paying a lot more in compared to situations
where a much larger service is being outsourced. Whatever the case, public agencies that
outsource get to see the price tag of the service even before the service is provided. The
associated price tag is very much dependent on the quantity of the product/service being
outsourced and the degree of asset specificity.

2

Thompson (2011) has argued that although ignoring managerial ability contributes to the endogeneity of the
decision to outsource, it may not be an issue in empirical analysis since such abilities change slowly over
time. Ignoring it however means deliberately increasing the likelihood of obtaining biased results.
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Therefore, establishing the causal effects of outsourcing on pupil transportation
costs requires an exogenous source of variation in the production choice. I use the voting
behavior of Minnesota residents and districts‟ experience with outsourcing before the
change in the pupil transportation law as instruments. Following Iseki (2010), I use the
voting behavior of Minnesota residents in the state House elections as an instrument for the
decision to outsource. Intuitively, differential voting behavior across the state induces
quasi-experimental differences on school districts‟ governance structures and these
differences may be important for both those districts that believe they have high costs of
pupil transportation and those that believe they have low pupil transportation costs. This
may induce outsourcing for both high and low cost districts motivated by a desire to realize
lower costs. Similarly, districts that have prior experience may be more likely to outsource
or less likely to outsource depending on their past experience with contractors in the pupil
transportation industry. The assumption here is that there is variation in the support for
outsourcing in the education sector based on one‟s political orientation or previous
experience with private suppliers. The nature of the endogenous decision to outsource, its
consequence on empirical studies, and how to address it are explored further in this study.
The dataset used in this study consists of data on 343 Minnesota public school
districts. Minnesota is interesting because until 1997 it was illegal for a school district to
apply funds meant for pupil transportation to any of its other operations, such as purchasing
office supplies or classroom supplies that may enhance teaching and learning. The 1997
change in the funding mechanism added transportation funds to the General Fund. The
General Fund is the discretionary budget component for a school district. Thus, per the
1997 change, school districts can allocate any cost savings in pupil transportation to other
6

needs, such as office supplies. This change in funding certainly created an incentive
towards cost reduction. Reducing costs involves making a decision regarding whether to
provide pupil transportation in-house (make) or outsource (buy). The dataset allows for an
examination of the nature of school districts that outsource and the differences in
operational costs between the districts outsourcing and those producing in-house. In
addition, the Minnesota school districts‟ dataset offers an opportunity to examine the nature
of the districts that switched from in-house to using a contractor to transport their pupils
and the resulting impact of this decision on costs.
In sum, this paper differs from other studies on the tasks of measuring the impact
of outsourcing on pupil transportation costs by: (1) taking into account the endogenous
nature of the decision to outsource, (2) using a twelve-year panel dataset that covers all
public school districts in Minnesota, and (3) using a sample of districts that have both preand post-outsourcing adoption costs to estimate the effect of outsourcing on costs. A
byproduct of the methods employed in this paper is that the factors that influence the
decision to outsource in the pupil transportation industry are also examined. The rest of the
study is organized in the following way: Section 2 provides some background information
about the school districts, finances and governance structure in Minnesota, Section 3
examines the nature of outsourcing in the public sector, Section 3 reviews the literature,
Section 4 describes the data, Section 5 presents the empirical framework, and Section 6
presents the results. The results are then discussed in Section 7 and some policy issues
examined. Concluding comments are made in Section 8.

7

2.0

THE PUPIL TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY IN MN:
GOVERNANCE AND FINANCE

This section presents an overview of the study area, Minnesota (MN). It examines the
nature of school districts regarding their day to day management, finances and the nature of
the pupil transportation industry. This is important as it offers an insight into the nature of
the PK-12 education sector, the decision making process and nature of student
transportation costs across districts.

2.1

Public School Districts, Management and Finances
The provision of public elementary and secondary education in Minnesota is

partnership between the state on one hand and local school districts and charter schools on
the other. The geographic boundaries of a local school district are determined by the
Minnesota Department of Education (DoE). In most cases, a local school district must
admit all pupils who live within its borders. A school district is often made up of a number
of schools serving PK-12 pupils. Complimenting school districts are charter schools, which
began appearing in the early 1990s. Charter schools are independently operated public
schools started by parents, teachers, community organizations, and for-profit companies.
These schools like public school districts receive state funding but the sponsoring group
may also come up with private funding. These schools must adhere to the basic curricular
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requirements of the state but are free from many of the regulations that apply to traditional
schools. Unlike public schools, they are not subject to the scrutiny of school boards or
government authorities. Charter schools usually specialize in a particular area of study,
such as technology or the arts, or adopt a basic core-subjects approach. Some charter
schools specifically target gifted or high-risk kids. They usually have smaller classes and
offer more individual attention than conventional public schools. During the 2012-2013
school-year, there were 336 school districts and 158 charter schools in Minnesota with
844,000 pupils3 . Full-time equivalent teaching staff was 52,173. In addition, an estimated
70,715 pupils were enrolled in nonpublic schools, and 17,129 pupils were homeschooled.
Public schools get their financing from local, state, and federal government funds,
but their day-to-day management rests with an elected school board. The school board is
charged with the care, management and control of the affairs of the school district and
consists of six members elected to four-year terms and a seventh member if so approved by
voters in the school district (Minn. Stat. § 123B.09, Subd. 1.). School board members are
elected during the November General Election on either odd or even years. At least three
members are on the ballot during each election. The school board issues bonds with voter
approval, levies taxes, hires and discharges employees, contracts for services, and
purchases facilities and equipment4 . School boards hire, direct, and evaluate the
performance of a superintendent who handles the day-to-day administrative affairs of the
school district.

3
4

Appendix 2 presents a list of all school districts used in th is study.
Minn. Stat. § 123B.02 outline the duties of a school district.
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Funding for school districts come from the local, state and federal government. The
Minnesota school finance system is the method by which funds are provided to operate
public elementary and secondary schools. The bulk of state support for elementary and
secondary education is distributed to school districts through the general education revenue
program, which provides money for the current operating expenditures of the districts. The
remaining portion of the state‟s appropriation to local districts is provided through special
purpose or categorical aids, such as special education aid and local property tax relief aids.
School districts also receive state appropriations through categorical aids, which are funds
designated for specific purposes (such as special education and school integration or
desegregation). For the 2012-2013 academic year, the state provided approximately 66
percent of the total costs of elementary and secondary education. Local revenue sources
(primarily property taxes and fees for services such as school lunch) provided
approximately 28 percent of 2012-2013 operating revenues, and the federal government
provided approximately 6 percent. The bulk of state support for elementary and secondary
education is distributed to the districts through the general education revenue program.
Funding mechanisms for school districts have undergone several changes since
1960. The current funding mechanism takes its roots from the First Session of the 1987
Legislature. The 1987 funding mechanism replaced the foundation aid program with a
modified funding formula called the general education revenue program, effective for the
1998-1989 academic year. General education revenue is the primary formula for providing
general operating funds to school districts and charter schools. General education formula
components have remained relatively stable since 1989. Each component is expected to
reflect school district funding needs in different areas and is therefore based on number of
10

pupils and different need. A school district‟s general education revenue is the sum of 15
components, including basic revenue and transportation sparsity revenue. Basic education
revenue for each district equals the product of the formula allowance multiplied by the
pupil units for the school year. Sparsity revenue provides additional revenue to
geographically large districts that have relatively few secondary pupils. The formula
measures sparsity and isolation of the district and then provides additional revenue to the
district using an assumption about how many pupil units are necessary to run an acceptable
secondary program. The formula assumes that a district with 400 secondary pupils in
average daily attendance can provide an acceptable secondary program. Therefore, a
district with one high school, no matter how few pupils per square mile it has, will not
receive any sparsity aid if the district has a secondary average daily membership (SADM)
in excess of 400. In addition, the requirement of large geographic size ensures funding for
districts that have few pupils due to geographic isolation and not due to a school board‟s
reluctance to cooperate with a neighboring school district that may have the capacity to
absorb secondary level pupils.
There is a lot of variation in annual per pupil expenditures across school districts in
Minnesota. Variations occur according to the regional characteristics and level of pupil
need. Total general fund expenditures per pupil and instruction and instruction- related
expenditures are highest in cities compared to non-city districts. Administration and
transportation expenditures per pupil tend to be highest in rural– remote and city districts.
Compared with other locales, rural– remote districts had lower enrollment and pupil
population density, longer drive times to the nearest urban area, and higher shares of
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economically disadvantaged pupils and special education pupils. Within rural and town
districts, the percentage of these pupils increased with remoteness.

2.2

The Pupil Transportation Industry in Minnesota
The combined expenditure of all states on pupil transportation in the United States

was over $23 billion in 2011 (Cornman, 2013). The Environmental Protection Agency
estimates that some 25 million pupils are transported to and from school each day in about
600,000 yellow school buses, providing nearly 11 billion pupil trips and accumulating four
billion miles each year. Over 200,000 of school buses are operated by some 4,000 private
companies.

While one may argue that the pupil transportation industry in Minnesota is

largely homogenous in terms of the various laws that govern it, several differences
however exist in terms of actual organization from one district to the other.
Section 123B.88 of Minnesota Statutes spells out the categories of pupils that must
be transported. School districts are required to provide “To-and-from” school transportation
to any pupil who lives two or more miles away from her school. “To-and-from” school
transportation is defined as the pupil‟s trip to school at the beginning of the school day and
the trip home at the end of the school day. It is however, a local school district‟s decision
on whether or not to transport pupils who live less than two miles from school.
The laws also allow school districts a choice between providing pupil transportation
in-house, fully outsourcing, or some combination of contractor provision and in-house
production. The Minnesota Department of Education (DoE) recommends that school
districts contract services for one year. To outsource, school districts must publicly
12

advertise for the supply of the product. This is aimed at introducing competition into the
production process. Unfortunately, advertising may not make much of a difference in terms
of generating competition since there exists one local transport provider in many counties
or the school district may not be large enough to attract the needed number of private
providers needed to generate competition. Although most cost components are spelt out in
the contract, adjustments may occur if gas prices increase during the school year.
Multinational companies such as First Pupil may not be interested in bidding for service in
small school districts.
The DoE spent a little over $9 billion on education in 2013; this works to $10,665
per pupil. Regular instruction expenditure accounted for about 44 percent of the
expenditure while pupil transportation accounted for about 6 percent. Public school
districts transported 681,033 pupils using 16,472 buses during the year. The majority of
buses are of Type C and Type D5 . While the two classes of buses form 73 percent of
districts fleet, they form 54 percent of contractors‟ fleet. Total mileage covered by all buses
was 127 million miles with contractors accounting for 64 percent of the miles.
A better insight into the pupil transportation can be gained by looking at the
activities of school districts during a single school year. For this purpose, I examine the
most recent school year in this study, 2013. During the year under review, about 80 percent
of all school districts in Minnesota engaged a contractor to provide some or all of their
pupil transportation services. Out of the 268 school districts using a contractor, 20 percent
5

School buses are restricted to a maximum width of 102in and a maximum length of 45ft. They are designed
to carry between 16 and 90 passengers (including drivers and any other s taff). The maximum passenger
capacity for a Type C is 70 and 90 for Type D. Type A busses are designed to carry between 16 and 36
pupils while B is designed to carry a minimum of 30 and a maximu m of 36 passenger.
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of these districts relied on a contractor for all of their pupil transportation. Public school
districts transported 633,771 pupils. The average cost per district was $722,000, and per
pupil cost stood at $523. There was a lot of variation in costs across districts as shown in
Table 2. For instance, while Franconia recorded the lowest total costs of $14,815, AnokaHennipin recorded the highest total costs of $10.2 million. Anoka-Hennipin also
transported the largest number of pupils: 31,830 pupils. Hendricks School District
transported the lowest number of pupils: 73. Table 2 shows the top and bottom five districts
according to their total transportation costs and their corresponding cost per pupil
transported, cost per mile, total miles, and production choice (outsource or in-house
production). There is an equal number of districts that outsourced in the category “high
costs” districts and bottom five districts. This may suggests that both low- and high-cost
school districts are motivated by the costs reduction benefits of outsourcing as argued by
proponents.
The biggest contractor is First Pupil (a subsidiary of First Group), with annual
operating income estimated at around $20-50 million6 . Interestingly, the districts with the
highest and lowest total cost engaged contractors for all their pupil transportation needs,
while the districts with the lowest and highest cost per pupil produced in-house. In districts
that fully outsourced, average cost at the district level was $400,565 compared to $154,204
for districts that produced fully in-house. Average cost per pupil transported was $396 for
districts that fully outsourced and $355 for districts that fully produced in-house.

6

Estimates from online searches. First Group is the leading student transport operator in the UK and North
America.
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3.0

THE LITERATURE ON OUTSOURCING AND THE PUPIL
TRANSPORTATION INDUSTRY
A few studies have examined impact of outsourcing on pupil transportation costs. A

survey of reveal conflicting results regarding the cost effects of outsourcing on costs. For
instance, while Thompson (2011), Lazarus and McCullough (2005), Alspaugh (1996),
Harding (1990), Hutchinson and Pratt (1999), Cassell (2000), and Hutchinson and Pratt
(2007) conclude that outsourcing increases pupil transportation costs, Damask (2000) Ross
(1988), McGuire and van Cott (1984), and Bails (1979) find evidence in support of
outsourcing as a means to reducing costs. Many of these studies have examined the effect
outsourcing on both total and average transportation costs.
Researchers have also examined whether outsourcing affects rural and urban school
districts differently. For instance, Lazarus and McCullough (2005) report a 4 percent
increase in cost in urban school districts compared to an 18 percent increase in costs for
rural school districts. Thompson (2011) observes a similar differential impact; 14 percent
increase in costs for urban school districts and 19 percent in nonurban areas.
The studies that have been reviewed here as well as this one aim at estimating the
impact of outsourcing on pupil transportation cost. The basic empirical method involves
estimating some form of a cost function with a measure of outsourcing included as one of
the independent variables. The sign, magnitude and statistical significance of the estimated
15

coefficient on the outsourcing variable are then evaluated. This strategy can produce
reliable ceteris paribus estimate of the effect outsourcing has on costs; so long as the
explanatory variables are exogenous. Unfortunately, the potential for bias remains due to
the fact that the outsourcing variable is not randomly assigned. Other potential sources of
biased

results

include

failing

to

deal with managerial abilities,

individual district

differences (due to location for instance), and special occurrence during the school year.
Although most of these can be reduced if not eliminated through the use of panel data,
many of the studies used one year of school data. Cross-sectional data analysis takes into
account heterogeneity among school districts, but not variance within districts over time
that may determine transition from one level of outsourced service to another. A researcher
may attempt to avoid this (for example; Pucher, Markstedt, and Hirshman, 1983 study on
US public transit) by using a dummy variable to represent different years of observations.
In this case, a year dummy variable can pick up the effects of variables that vary over time
but not among agencies, and it also leaves out the effects of variables that vary over time
and among districts.
The range of explanatory variables used in the studies also varies. Pupil head count,
district size, number of miles travelled by school buses and some measure of outsourcing
are included in all studies. Apart from these other variables such as gas prices (Lazarus and
McCullough, 2005), wages (Lazarus and McCullough, 2005), driver salary (Hutchinson &
Pratt, 1999), population density (Thompson, 2011; Hutchinson & Pratt, 1999), and number
of school days (Thompson, 2011; Hutchinson & Pratt, 1999). When considering the
relative strengths of the independent variables used in the previous studies, it important to
note that many critical cost determinants are very difficult or even impossible to measure
16

with any degree of accuracy. Some of these determinants include the competence of
administrators and managers, the competitive environment in which contracting occurs, the
topographies of routes in a district and the degree of oversight exercised by school boards.
The key variable of interest here as in previous studies is a measure of the
outsourcing variable. From the empirical literature, outsourcing is traditionally defined as a
dummy variable set equal to one if a public agency uses a contractor to provide some or all
of its transportation needs, and zero otherwise. Hutchinson & Pratt (2007) in a study of the
Louisiana school system, however define the outsourcing variable as a set of dummy
variables: full outsourcing, mostly outsourcing, and mostly in-house. Each category is then
compared to fully in-house cost of provision. Iseki (2010) argues partial outsourcing
explains that agencies that partially outsource see higher cost savings than those that fully
outsource. He attributes this difference in costs savings to the threat of outsourcing more of
the in-house production. Due to a similar threat of insourcing to already outsourced service,
contractors are also more likely to contain costs than if this threat was absent. In some
studies, the outsourcing variable has also been so that it is continuous variable. For
instance, it has been defined the ratio of buses operated by a contractor to the total number
of buses serving a school district within a year (Thompson, 2011). It has also been defined
as the ratio of contractor bus miles to total miles recorded by all buses that served a school
district the academic year (Thompson, 2011; Ross, 1988).
The peculiar nature of the pupil transportation industry does not make these
definitions directly applicable. Assume a school district engages a contractor to bus some
of its pupils for a month during the school year. The contractor uses 10 buses to perform
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this function. If the district itself operates 10 buses, then the definition of outsourcing as a
ratio yields a 50 percent level of outsourcing, partial-outsourcing (according to the
trichotomous definition of outsourcing by Iseki, 2010) or outsourcing (according to the
traditional view). The issue that arises here is whether this scenario qualifies as outsourcing
and the definition of outsourcing that is most appropriate. A related issue has to do with
route(s) allotted to the contractors. Is the level of outsourcing the same although a
contractor transports pupils who reside a few miles away from a school while another has
to deal with pupils several miles away? Also, is the level of outsourcing the same if two
school districts are identical but differ in the size of buses used by their respective
contractors? For instance, both school districts partially outsource, but one uses a
contractor with 10 large buses while the other uses a contractor with 10 small buses. To
overcome such controversial issues surrounding the definition of outsourcing in the nature
of the pupil transportation industry, and, because the objective of this paper is to examine
the impact of outsourcing on pupil transportation costs, outsourcing here is an indicator
variable which assumes the value of one if a school district‟s pupil transportation function
is fully carried out by a contractor, and zero otherwise.
Table 2 presents a summary table of studies in the pupil transportation industry. The
table includes study area, number of observation, explanatory variables, and results for
each study.
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4.0

DATA FOR ANALYSIS

The main dataset for my analysis comes from administrative files and public records of
Minnesota Department of Education (DoE). The panel dataset is based is based on 343
public school districts covering the period 2002-2013. The DoE collects data on both
public school districts and nonpublic schools on an annual basis. The data include school
and district-level information on finance, personnel, and pupil information such as
attendance and test scores. Financial data include various sources of revenue and
expenditure during the school year. Some expenditure variables include salaries and
benefits for instructional and non-instructional staff, pupil transportation costs, and
maintenance costs. There is also information on the number of buses a school district
engaged during the school. These busses are further divided into the number operated by a
school district and the number operated by a contractor. This information however does not
go further to indicate the period a particular bus served the district. This is one of the
reasons why the outsourcing variable is simply defined as an indicator variable set equal to
one if a district fully outsources and zero otherwise. As explained above, the other
advantages of this definition is that one does not have to be concerned about kind of routes
the contractor is assigned nor the size of buses different contractors use. Moreover, the
research question is whether outsourcing lowers costs or not. Thus this definition focuses
on the question at hand.
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The other independent variables of interest for this study include the number of
pupils transported, the number of miles travelled, and the extent of the physical size of the
school district. Other control variables include the full-time equivalent staff (FTE),
population density at the county level, wages and benefits paid to transportation staff, and
average gas prices at the county level. Pupils-FTE is a ratio of the total number of pupils in
school district to the number of FTE in the district. This ratio helps capture the capacity of
employees at managing pupils in the district. I provide a list of the variables of interest used
in this study, and their definitions in Table 1. The third column in Table 1 also shows the
expected signs of the estimated coefficients of the explanatory variables in a regression.
Since the effect of outsourcing on costs is inconclusive from the reviewed literature, I have
not made any a priori assumptions for the variable. All other variables are expected to have
positive coefficients.
As is the practice with most empirical papers that have examined the impact of
outsourcing on transportation costs the dependent variable is defined as the log of some
measure of costs (total transportation costs and cost per pupil transported in this study).
Both total and average costs measures were converted to 2013 dollars, using the consumer
price index for Minnesota, 2002-2013. This inflation adjusted measure of costs allows us to
directly compare costs across the different years in this study.
The sample size used in the analysis is 3,621 observations involving the 343 public
school districts in Minnesota. Since most of the variables are recorded at the district level, I
restrict all analysis to the district level. In the following subsections, the characteristics of
outsourcing to and in-house producing districts are compared.
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4.1

Characteristics of In-house and Outsourcing Districts in Minnesota
This section describes the nature of school districts that outsource and those that

provide pupil transportation in-house. For every academic year, school districts have to
choose either to outsource the pupil transportation service or produce in-house. Based on
this choice, the sample across all years can be divided in two: districts that outsource and
those that provide the transportation service in-house. Figure 1 shows the costs and
outsourcing trends for the typical district over the period, 2002-2013. It shows that the
average cost of transportation per school district per year, and the percentage of districts
fully outsourcing have declined over time. About 40 percent of school districts outsourced
in the early 2000s compared to 19 percent in 2013. The decline in outsourcing has been
accompanied by a decrease in transportation costs per district over the period. The typical
district spent about $1,000,000 on pupil transportation in 2002. This declined to $679,010
by 2013, representing a 32 percent fall over the 20002 district average cost.
Notwithstanding the trend in cost and outsourcing, Figure 1 does not necessarily
imply that the costs of in-house provision of pupil transportation are lower than contractoroperated costs. The declining cost may well be due to increased efficiency in the industry.
It may also be due to noneconomic factors such as local politics and safety standards of
contractor-operated buses. For instance, while two percent of public school districts‟ buses
failed the mandatory safety inspection tests in the state, seven percent of all contractoroperated buses failed the same tests during the 2013 year (Diedrich and O‟Brien, 2014).
The largest contractor, First Pupil recorded an 85 percent pass rate.
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Table 2 provides more details about the nature of the districts that outsource (see
Outsource column of Table 2) and those that do not (see In-house column of Table 2).
Table 2 shows that about 29 percent of the entire sample outsourced pupil transportation.
About 17 the percent of all school districts are located in a metropolitan area. The average
cost per district over the period is $867,331, with per-pupil cost at $474.
There are some distinguishing features between school districts that fall under the
In-house column in Table 2 and those under Outsource. School districts located in urban
areas are more likely to outsource than those in rural Minnesota. School districts that
outsourced pupil transportation are located in counties that are densely populated, have
lower input prices (for example, gas and wages), but tend to have higher overall costs (for
instance, total costs and per-pupil transportation costs), and transport more pupils.

This

may suggest that either these outsourcing districts are inefficient or the high cost is
observed because they outsourced. The average total cost per district over the period was
$1.32 million in outsourcing districts but $680,522 for districts operating in-house.
Average cost per-pupil transported was $464 for districts producing in-house but $500 for
those using a contractor. Outsourcing school districts, however, transport about 80 percent
more pupils than in districts where the service is provided in-house. Despite transporting
more pupils, outsourcing school districts have higher per-pupil costs than those districts
providing the service in-house. Districts outsourcing pupil transportation also have higher
pupil-FTE ratios. The data reveals that the level of outsourcing varies positively with both
cost and pupil-FTE ratio. Specifically, there is a positive and statistically significant
correlation (ρ = 0.35) between total transportation cost and the level of outsourcing and a
statistically significant and positive correlation (ρ = 0.26) between pupil-FTE ratio and the
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level of outsourcing. These may suggest managerial issues that may arise with increasing
number of pupils or contractors‟ preference for large school districts so that they
(contractors) can enjoy scale economies (Lazarus and McCullough, 2005).
A further examination of the data shows that each district can be put in one of three
categories based on its outsourcing decision throughout the twelve year period, 2002-2013:
Category 1 (those districts that never outsourced during the twelve year period), Category 2
(involves those districts that have always used a contractor) and Category 3 (districts that
switched between the two modes of production during the period under study). Category 3
involves 111 school districts, constituting 32 percent of the 343 public school districts. The
nature of Category 3 districts allows the researcher to observe a district‟s pre-contractor era
costs and post-outsourcing adoption costs. This is a useful feature as it gives a truer
indication of the impact of outsourcing on costs.
Category 3 districts experienced an annual trend in average cost per district and
outsourcing similar to the full sample in Figure 1. For instance, about 78 percent of all
districts in this category used a contractor in 2002 to provide all of their pupil
transportation needs. By 2013, only a quarter of these districts fully outsourced the pupil
transportation function. With the decline in outsourcing, average cost per district also
dropped from $1,184,917 in 2002 to $742,000 in 2013.
Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics for this subsample of districts that
switched (Category 3) production mode during the period. Overall, the subsample recorded
higher costs compared to the full sample. For instance, average cost per district and average
cost per pupil transported are $991,522 and $528, respectively. Both measures of costs are
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higher than those for the full sample. This may suggests that high-cost districts are more
likely to outsource or that outsourcing indeed increases costs.
The districts in this subsample can also be grouped according to the outsourcing
decision each district makes in each year. The average cost per district that outsourced in
this subsample (Category 3) is lower than the full sample average. The percentage of
districts outsourcing is also much higher (50.1 percent compared to 29 percent for the
entire sample). These Category 3 districts are mostly less populated, but they transported
many more pupils on average than outsourcing districts in the full sample. The average
school size is also smaller; 186 square miles compared to the average 250 square miles for
the full sample. Other notable differences include the higher than average pupil-FTE ratio,
lower total benefits, and higher gas prices.
Within this switch subsample, outsourced pupil transportation costs are also higher
than in-house production costs, just as in the full sample. Thus, similar to Table 2, districts
under this category can be grouped under In-house and Outsource. Districts that outsource
under this category recorded average of $1,228,608 per district and $546 per pupil.
Districts providing pupil transportation in-house on the other hand have average cost per
district at $748,082 and $511 per pupil.
Tables 4 and 5 suggest that the districts that outsource have higher costs. However,
the descriptive analyses do not control for many factors that may affect costs. Thus, the
positive correlation between costs and outsourcing may not necessarily mean causation.
Thus, there is the need for further analysis in order to corroborate or reject this initial
finding. As a matter of fact, the analysis thus far only shows the difference in costs between
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districts that have outsourced and those producing in in-house. Whether the reason for this
difference is due to outsourcing cannot be disentangled from the descriptive analysis and
therefore the need for further examination. More so, these descriptive analyses fail to
control for the endogeneity of the outsourcing decision. As will be demonstrated in later
subsections of this study, a failure to correct for the endogeneity produces unreliable
empirical results.
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5.0

EMPIRICAL FRAMEWORK

Equation 1, below, specifies the form of the models to be estimated. The
specification is similar to that used by Williams (1979), Viton (1981), Berndt et al. (1993),
Friedlander et al. (1993), Nicosia (2001) and Iseki (2008, 2010) in studies on public transit
systems in the U.S; and Lazarus and McCullough (2005), and Thompson (2011) in studies
on pupil transportation. The model is estimated using the Minnesota school district-level
data as described in the previous section. The model assumes that the typical school district
outsources its pupil transportation service in order to minimize the costs of provision. The
model also assumes that school districts have similar transportation technology such as
buses and routing technology.
(1)
where

is a measure of pupil transportation costs in district

in year . The main

outcome variables I used to help gauge the impact of outsourcing on costs are the
logarithmic transformation of total costs and per pupil costs. In the case of panel datasets,
the logarithmic transformation of the data straightens out exponential growth patterns and
reduces heteroscedasticity. Examining per-unit cost measures is important since it is
possible that overall costs could fall while average cost still rises. For instance, if a district
loses many pupils over time, it is true that its total cost may fall, but total cost may not fall
as fast and in such a case, average cost per pupil could end up being higher. On the other
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hand, districts that are able to find better routing and other innovative ways of transporting
pupils drive down average pupil cost even where the number of pupils needing
transportation increases. The regressor of interest,

, is an indicator variable that equals

one if a district relies fully on a contractor in the performance of its pupil transportation
duties, and zero otherwise.

is a vector of output measures: log(miles), log(pupils

transported), and log(area). The vector

contains other control variables: log(benefits),

metropolitan indicator, population density, and pupil-FTE ratio. The term

denotes year

fixed-effects, and i denotes district fixed-effects.
To estimate the causal effect of outsourcing on costs, the decision to outsource
pupil transportation must be uncorrelated with unobserved determinants of cost captured in
the error term,

, conditional on district fixed effects and observable characteristics. If

costs determine the decision to outsource, then estimates of the effect of outsourcing on
pupil transportation costs derived from OLS regression in Equation 1 would be
inconsistent.

5.1

The Endogenous Decision to Outsource
As stated above, the decision to outsource is not randomly assigned to school

districts. It may well be influenced by the transportation costs a school district observes. If
this is the case, OLS estimates of outsourcing would be biased. In this section, I discuss the
factors that may influence the decision to outsource in the public sector in the following
subsection and the potential bias that may result in studies that fail to address the
endogenous decision to outsource. The first stage regression results in this study also offers
27

insight into the some of the important determinants of outsourcing peculiar to pupil
transportation industry.

5.1.1. Factors Determining the Decision to Outsource in the Public Sector
The choice between outsourcing and in-house production is a complex process of
contract design, negotiations, monitoring and evaluation. The decision to outsource
requires

balancing

efficiency

goals

with

public

values

while

considering

the

competitiveness of both public and private markets for government service (Warner &
Hebdon, 2001). Not surprising, many reasons have been identified in the literature
regarding why a government agency may decide to change from one form of service
delivery to another (Bland, 2010; Bradbury & Waechter, 2009; Brown & Potoski, 2003;
Brown et al., 2008; Fernandez & Smith, 1996; Hefetz & Warner, 2004; Hirsch, 1991;
Hodge, 2000; Jang, 2006; Morgan & Kickham, 1999; Segal 2005; Thompson & Elling,
2000; Warner & Hefetz, 2009).
The lowering of costs is one of the most often cited factors contributing to the
decision to outsource (Hirsch, 1995; Segal, 2005; Lamothe and Lamothe, 2015). Agencies
observing an increasing growth in production costs “feel the pressure” to cut back and are
therefore more likely to rely on an alternative mode of provision (Lamothe and Lamothe,
2015). Segal (2005) reports that results from many studies suggest that outsourcing
contributes in the range of 5 to 50 percent to costs reduction, depending on the scope and
type of service, to the decision to outsource. Thus, local governments with restricted
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revenue-raising abilities are more likely to turn to the private sector for the production of
services (Benton & Menzel, 1992).
Another reason for outsourcing, according to Savas (2000) and Van Slyke (2003), is
due to political motives rather than economic considerations. Elected leaders strongly
consider the role of the different groups within their community, their participation level,
the political consequences of implementing decisions that go against their interests, and the
perception the public will have of the outsourcing decisions made. Thus, Benton and
Menzel (1992) conclude that outsourcing is more likely to occur in areas where groups
with vested interests in government services have relatively less influence on service
delivery options. In general, the research shows that members of minority groups,
individuals with lower income, and the elderly typically see outsourcing as a threat to the
quantity and quality of public programs (Fernandez & Smith, 2006; Morgan, Hirlinger, &
England, 1988; Thompson & Elling, 2000). In addition to government structure,
unionization, political influences, cost reductions, quality of services and economies of
scale, fiscal mandates can also be influential in the choice between producing in-house and
outsourcing. Local government units are subject to legal constraints from state constitutions
and statutes and, therefore, have less control over their financial conditions.
Labor unions have also been found to influence the level of outsourcing. Public
employees often fear outsourcing will lead to layoffs, lower wages and benefits. Not
surprising, unionization is a barrier to outsourcing. There is a natural interest in union to
preserve their power and influence as well. Several studies have confirmed the negative
relationship between outsourcing and labor unionization (Warner & Hebdon, 2001).
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Fernandez and Smith (2006) for instance find that public sector employees‟ organizations
in Georgia were more likely to oppose outsourcing programs than private sector
employees.
Finally, outsourcing has been found to be more likely among government agencies
that have prior interaction with outside suppliers. Examining the determinants and
consequences of outsourcing in more than 1,000 Texas school districts for 1997-2008, Rho
(2013) finds that outsourcing is negatively related to spending on school districts‟ core
instructional functions, budget shocks and enrollment shocks but positively related to
school district performance and past experience with private contractors.
All of the factors outlined thus are also potential instruments in an instrumental
variable approach to dealing the endogenous outsourcing decision. As stated above,
ignoring the reverse causality between costs and the decision to outsource leads to
inconsistent estimates. If outsourcing leads to cost savings, then the expected sign of the
outsource coefficient in the cost equation is negative. However, outsourcing is not
randomly assigned to school districts. Instead, the decision to outsource may well be
correlated with observable and unobservable factors that vary across districts and across
time. As a result, the endogeneity of the outsourcing decision will likely bias the estimated
coefficient on outsourcing if ignored. To illustrate, suppose the following model is to be
estimated:
(2)
where all variables are defined as before in (1). If (2) is estimated without controlling for
the endogenous nature of

, the estimated coefficient on outsourcing is given by:
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(

̂

(

where ̂ is the estimated impact and

(3)

)
)

is the population parameter. The direction of
(

inconsistency is determined by the sign of

). The direction of the bias is

unclear, and reasonable arguments can be made for both a positive and a negative bias in
the estimated coefficient. For example, many state legislatures have endorsed competitive
outsourcing in order to reduce expenditures and deficits. Does this mean more high-cost
districts or financially stressed districts are more likely to outsource? If high cost districts
are more likely to adopt outsourcing in an effort to improve a precarious financial situation,
the regression results are likely to be biased against finding a negative coefficient; since
(

)

in this case. It is also plausible that districts that have a predisposition

toward financial conservatism, despite having low transportation costs, may still choose to
outsource pupil transportation. If low cost districts are the districts choosing to outsource,
the regression results are likely biased toward finding a negative coefficient. In that case,
the estimated impact is greater than it should be: ̂

.

A consistent estimate for the effect of outsourcing on transportation costs can be
recovered if there is at least one variable

that, in addition to being uncorrelated with the

error term in Equation 1, is also a strong predictor of the likelihood of outsourcing in a
school district in the following first stage regression:
(4)
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where

is the indicator variable for outsource decision of district

time fixed effect,

in year ,

is the

is a vector of school districts characteristics including pupil and other

independent variables from (1), and

is an error term. The causal effect can be estimated

using two-stage least squares (2SLS).
Given the preceding, I use the voting behavior of residents in the state‟s House
elections and past experience with outside providers to instrument for the endogenous
decision to outsource. The other determinants of outsourcing discussed above were not
used as instruments because they were not available or did not satisfy the requirements
necessary of a good instrument. A good instrument for the decision to outsource must
satisfy two conditions. First, it must have a strong effect on the decision to outsource.
Second, for instrument validity, 2SLS should retain only the variation in the likelihood of
the decision to outsource that is generated by the quasi-experimental variation generated by
the instrument. This means that the instruments should not be correlated with the
unobserved determinants of pupil transportation costs. Intuitively, 2SLS allows us to
compare the transportation costs of districts that differ in their propensity to outsource
because they vote in a certain way or because a district dealt with an outside provider
before the change in the law in 1998. In this section, I show that the proposed instruments
are both valid and relevant.
The choice of voting behavior as an instrument is based on recent empirical work
and theoretical exposition by Tadelis and Levin (2010), Besley and Coate (1997), and
Osborne and Slivinski (1996). According to Tadelis and Levin (2010), education or health
“complex” services and are therefore difficult to outsource. They however find that
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Republican dominated areas tend to have to have a higher propensity to outsource such
complex services to the private sector. Voter behavior as captured by vote shares obtained
by political parties in an election or political representation in the legislature has also been
proposed by Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2000), and Willcocks and Currie (1997). This
voter behavior has been used by Nicosia (2002) and Iseki (2010) as exclusion restrictions
in studies on public transit systems in the United States. Apart from these studies, Goldman
and So (2009) suggest that members of the Republican Party are more likely to promote
private sector participation in the public production process than their Democratic Party
counterparts.
The voting behavior of residents can be implemented by using the percentage share
of votes received by each political party in the Minnesota State House elections or the
political affiliation of the representative‟s district where the school district belongs.

As it

turns out, however, using the categorical instrumental variable Republican, set equal to one
if a school district‟s representative in the Minnesota State House belongs to the Republican
Party, and zero otherwise, exhibits the strongest effect on the decision to outsource, as
indicated by the high F-test values from the first-stage regression results in Table 6. Thus
if districts have a choice, Republican-dominated areas are more likely to push towards
outsourcing. Also, based on the median voter theorem, it seems plausible that Republicandominated districts may have school boards dominated by Republicans, who would
naturally have a higher probability of outsourcing than areas dominated by Democrats.
As stated earlier, the empirical literature on the determinants of the decision to
outsource shows that government agencies that have had previous experience with private
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suppliers are also more likely to outsource. The study uses the variable Prior experience to
capture this previous experience. To this end, the study sought to establish those school
districts which used a private contractor before the change in the law governing basic
education financing. The study relied heavily on mantra.com, an online hub of registered
companies in Minnesota. With regards to firms in the pupil transportation industry, the site
has the names of such companies, date of incorporation, location and when it first provided
service to a particular school district. Prior experience is set equal one for school districts
that ever used a contractor before the change in the law financing K-12 education in
Minnesota and zero otherwise.
From the first stage results in Table 6, both instruments are statistically significant,
meaningful, and have the expected signs. These first stage results in this study offer an
insight into the factors that may be important in a school district‟s decision to engage a
contractor in the transportation of its pupils. The first stage regression results suggest that
school districts that have Republican Party representatives in the Minnesota State House of
Representatives are about 29 percent more likely to outsource. Population density and the
number of school days are also statistically significant and positively affect the decision to
outsource. On the other hand, the likelihood of outsourcing tends to decline with the total
number of miles travelled by pupils. These findings suggest that geographically large
school districts that are sparsely populated will therefore tend to have a lower likelihood of
outsourcing the pupil transportation service.
An initially surprising result from the first stage results is the fact that school
districts with high wage bills are also less likely to outsource. This may however suggest
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that there is strong opposition to outsourcing in such districts. Since there is no available
measure of labor unionization at the district, the total benefits paid to transportation staff
which is included here as an explanatory variable may also be capturing the effect of strong
labor unions. Theoretically, the existence of strong labor unions tends to be positively
correlated with workers‟ benefits. All other predictors were not statistically significant.
An additional requirement for a good instrument is that it should not directly
determine the outcome of the dependent variable, pupil transportation costs. For this
condition to hold, the instrument should be uncorrelated with the unobserved determinants
of pupil transportation costs. In this case, the correlation coefficient between the
Republican and transportation costs is 0.025 and 0.011 between Prior Experience and
transportation costs. A test of significance of the level of correlation between the dependent
and the instrumental variables show no evidence any meaningful correlation.
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6.0

RESULTS

I present the results from various estimations in this section. I present results from
estimations that do not address that the endogeneity of the outsourcing variable and results
from the 2SLS. I estimate the main equation using the log of total transportation costs and
the log of cost per pupil as the dependent variables. Other costs measures such as cost per
mile and the fraction of a districts annual expenditure that goes into pupil transportation are
also explored. These are useful since it is possible that production costs can increase due to
other factors other than an increase in output. It is also possible that average production
costs can fall even with an increase in the number of pupils transported if school districts
can find more efficient alternatives of transporting these pupils. Thus examining only total
cost may not reveal the true state of the effect of outsourcing on a school district‟s
transportation costs.

6.1.

First Stage Results: The Decision to Outsource
Tables 7 through 9 present the second stage regression results with different

measures of costs as the dependent variable. In all tables, results from a fixed-effects
regression are compared to results from the fixed-effects 2SLS. The Hausman test statistic
was used to determine whether fixed-effects 2SLS regression procedure was necessary or
straightforward ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was adequate. The first-stage of
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the 2SLS involves a fixed-effects regression of the outsourcing dummy,
remaining

explanatory variables in the main regression equation,

, on the

along with the

instrumental variables, Republican and Prior experience7 . The Republican variable
assumes the value one where a school district falls under a legislative district whose
representative belongs to the Republican Party. Prior experience assumes the value 1 if a
district ever used a contractor in the provision of it pupil transportation before 1998; when
the Minnesota statute governing pupil transportation funding was changed.
Results from the first-stage are presented in Table 6. The results show that the
coefficients on the instruments, Republican and Prior experience are positive and
statistically significant under any meaningful statistical significance levels. This suggests
that districts that are Republican or have Prior experience are more likely to outsource the
pupil transportation function. As can be observed in Table 6, the R-squared from the firststage ranges from 19.1 percent to about 12 percent, and a joint test of significance of the
instruments was about 98 in all the first stage regressions. Despite the strong statistical
significance shown by the instruments, Hall, Rudebusch, and Wilcox (1996) an F statistic
that is significant at the typical 5 or 10 percent level is not sufficient to justify the use of an
instrumental variable. This is because a large R-squared or adjusted R-squared may occur if
the endogenous variable is strongly correlated with the included exogenous variables but
only weakly correlated with the instrument. Stock, Wright, and Yogo (2002) thus suggest
that the F statistic should exceed 10 for inference based on the 2SLS estimator to be
7

Hausman (2002) has famously referred to a probit first stage in a two stage regression as the “forbidden
regression”. According to him, forbidden regression results in in consistent results. The main reason for the
inconsistency of the probit first stage followed by OLS in the second stage approach is that neither the
expectations operator nor the linear projections operator passes through a non -linear first stage. Therefore the
fitted values from a first stage probit are only uncorrelated with the second stage error term under very
restrictive assumptions that almost never hold in practice.
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reliable when there is one endogenous regressor. The null hypothesis of each of the StockYogo (2005) tests is that the set of instruments is weak. If the test statistic exceeds the
critical value, then the instrument(s) are not weak. The reported Stock-Yogo statistic from
the 2SLS was 19.93, suggesting that the instruments Republican and Prior experience pass
the Stock-Yogo weak identification tests. Also, the Cragg and Donald (1993) Wald F
statistic, and Anderson canonical correlation LM statistic add evidence that the instrument
are not weak as can be seen in Table 6.

6.2.

Impact of outsourcing on transportation costs
School districts, by law, are required to transport pupils who live more than two

away from their homes to and from school on each school day. Outsourcing has been
promoted as a means to reducing costs. School districts care about the number of pupils
they must transport and the price tag that comes with providing the service. In Table 7, I
present results from various regressions with log(transportation costs) as the dependent
variable. Table 8 presents the results where the outcome variable is the log(per pupil
transportation cost). The results in all estimations show that the coefficient of the
outsourcing variable is positive8 . This means outsourcing increases the costs of transporting
students. Table 9 presents results two sets where the dependent variables are log(cost per
mile) and cost-expenditure ratio. Cost here refers to the student transportation cost while
expenditure refers to the total expenditure for a school district during the year. This last
specification helps put student transportation costs in the dynamic nature of the education

8

The coefficient, ̂ , on

is transformed as follows: (
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̂

)

sector in Minnesota.

The main variable of interest in all specifications is “Outsource”. In

all specifications, the outsource variable is set equal one for districts that fully contract out
and zero otherwise9 .
Column 1 of Table 7 shows the pooled cross-sectional regression results with the
outsourcing variable as the only explanatory variable. As the results show, outsourcing
appears to be a very important determinant of costs. In column 2, all explanatory variable
and year dummies are included but district fixed effects are eliminated. Column 2 shows
that school districts have outsourced have costs that are 44.2 percent higher than districts
producing in-house. The problem with column 2 estimates (as with studies that have
followed the same procedure) is that it does not disentangle the difference in costs caused
outsourcing from those that are difference that are specific to school districts. In column 3,
where district specific differences are accounted for, the results show that outsourcing leads
to about a 10 percent increase in costs. The results in column 3 however assume that the
decision to outsource is randomly assigned to school districts. As discussed in previous
sections, this may not be the case since the costs of transportation observed by a school
district may well influence the decision to outsource. As a result, there is the need to
correct for the potential endogeneity of the outsourcing decision. The results in column
shows the results from a 2SLS regression of log(transportation costs) on all explanatory

9

Table 10 shows the results from the second stage of the FE 2SLS regression where the outsource variable is
defined as the ratio of contractor-operated buses to total number of buses that served the school district during
the year. Generally, the continuous variable nature here adds more information to the outsource variable but
as explained in the main text, this definition is not appropriate in measuring the level of outsourcing taking
place in the student transportation industry. The regression results are however in line with the general
conclusion of this study; that correcting for the endogenous decision to outsource produces a much bigger
effect of outsourcing on transportation costs.
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variables. The results show that the outsourcing increases pupil transportation costs by 21
percent.
Table 8 presents results where the outcome variable is log(per pupil transportation
costs). This is especially important in helping to reveal whether outsourcing gives a better
value per dollar or not. As mentioned in the previous sections, rising costs is not a problem
per se if it is accompanied an even faster growth in output. Thus evidence of rising total
costs may not necessarily imply inefficiencies of contractor provided services. Results in
Table 7 generally follow a similar trend as those presented in Table 7. As, shown in Table
7, simple OLS results in column 2 are significantly different from the fixed-effect result in
column 3. Basically, simple OLS overestimate the effect of outsourcing on costs. Columns
4 present the results from the 2SLS. The results show that per pupil cost increases by 15.72
percent when the endogenous decision is addressed. This result is higher than the about 11
percent in column 3. The 2SLS results here also show that the increase in per pupil
transportation costs due to outsourcing are lower than the estimated impact on total costs in
Table 7. This buttresses the results from summary statics which show that school districts
using contractors generally transported more pupils than school districts that produce in
house. The results suggest that whilst total costs may have been risen due outsourcing, the
number of pupils transported in outsourcing districts may have risen even faster.
Another measure of costs effectiveness apart from per pupil costs is cost per mile.
This is an important determinant of cost since it measures the cost per mile a district incurs
during the school day. Columns 1 and 2 present the results of the impact of outsourcing on
the cost per travelled by all buses that served a school district during the school year.

40

Column 1 and 2 show the fixed-effects and fixed-effects 2SLS regression results. The
results show that outsourcing increases cost per mile by about 3 percent where the
endogeneity of the outsourcing variable is not addressed and 5.2 percent following the
2SLS procedure.
Many factors may influence the number of miles a school bus covers during school
day. School districts with superior routing technical knowledge would observe operational
costs, all things equal. The sheer size of district and may also imply buses may have to
cover many miles each school day. Also, the maximum occupancy capacity may also
influence the number of miles covered by school buses during the school day. The smallest
school bus, Type A bus (carries a maximum of 36 pupils), may use less fuel per mile but it
will also less fewer pupils than a Type D bus (which can carry a maximum of 90 pupils).
According the DoE, most contractors in Minnesota use Type A and B buses. Although this
is an optimal strategic choice given that larger school busses tend to increase specificity in
relation to the pupil transportation industry, it also has consequence for costs and thus, a
need examine a cost efficiency measure such as cost per mile. The coefficients of the
outsourcing variable in both columns 1 and 2 here are much smaller than total cost and per
pupil magnitudes. As explained in the previous sections, however, this cost measure may
not be important to school district‟s objectives as far as pupil transportation is concerned.
School districts are interested a safe mode of transportation that also get pupils to school on
time.
Outsourcing has been advocated as a means to reducing costs. Yet, as has been
demonstrated here and from many of the previous empirical studies, outsourcing has not
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proved to be an effective means to costs reduction. It is true that school districts care about
the total outlays they have to contractors. Contractors equally care about the payments they
receive from districts for the service(s) provided. One issue that has been observed in the
outsourcing situation in Minnesota is the fact that contracts between districts and
contractors are not fixed. The lack of fixed contracts means that contractors can potentially
pass on any unforeseen costs to school districts. Given, that contract durations may make it
difficult to terminate contracts, outlays to contractors as a proportion of a districts total
expenditure

will increase,

forcing outsourcing districts to

shift funds from other

discretionary expenditure items. Also, to the extent that that a district insources in response
to rising outlays to a contractor, does not mean overall outlays to contractors may reduce
even if districts‟ budgetary allocations are not rising. For this reason, I examine whether
there is any evidence in cost shifting by school districts in order to meet contractor
payments. If such evidence does exist, then the burden of outsourcing on transportation
costs as a proportion of the districts‟ total budget should be statistically significant. This
examination of costs also helps focus the attention of school mangers on the manager
drivers of costs. It also integrates the pupil transportation industry with other duties of the
school district through the allocations made to various cost components. This view of
transportation costs is also useful in benchmarking a district‟s transportation cost as
compared with its neighbors or potential competitors (including contractors and nonpublic
school districts). Any large deviations of a district transportation cost-budget ratio from the
average district may indicate poor managerial decisions.
In columns 3 and 4 of Table 9, the results of the cost-expenditure ratio regressions
are presented. The results indicate that outsourcing increases this ratio. In particular
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outsourcing increases pupil transportation cost by about 0.9 percent as shown in column 3.
However, outsourcing increases costs by 1.91 percent when the endogeneity of the decision
is addressed in 2SLS estimates in column 4. These results suggest that outsourcing places a
burden on school districts‟ finance. It provides evidence that outsourcing either drives up
pupil transportation costs faster than any increases in funding to school districts or because
school districts have to shift funds from other projects or programs into moving pupils to
and from school.
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7.0

DISCUSSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The regression results show that outsourcing increases costs.

This may be

explained by the fact that in many districts there is only one contractor, especially in
Greater Minnesota. One precondition to outsourcing is the existence of a large number of
contractors who can compete away any likely rents. An online search on school busing
companies in Minnesota shows that most counties have only one registered company. An
online listing of pupil busing companies at http://www.manta.com confirms this; only 15
districts have more than one registered bus company. This means the envisaged
competition among companies for the right to provide pupil transportation is lost. The
puzzling question then is why school districts still outsource.
One of the reasons why school districts may not in-source despite high costs is if
board members believe their positions are threatened. School boards are likely to stick with
a mode of providing pupil transportation if there is any likely resistance by parents. For
instance, in a 2013 report commissioned by the state legislature, 41 percent of school
district managers mentioned that parents/community will not support a shift in the mode
pupil transportation is provided. As one respondent put it “why change something that
already works”. This is a plausible explanation to keeping a contractor since school boards
are elected by voters in the community they serve. Going against the “wishes” of parents
means board member risking their seats on the school board. Given this reality and the
knowledge that outsourcing increases costs, the decision to outsource need to be balanced
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with other performance benchmarks that the outsourcing school district must meet over the
course of the contract. For instance, the DoE can challenge school districts that outsource
to improve pupil performance in standardized tests. This is because, despite imposing a
burden on school districts, outsourcing possibly frees up man-hours which can then be used
up fulfilling other important goals of the school district.
School boards that find a threat to their position can however take some steps
towards containing the attendant cost due to outsourcing. For instance the use of fixed
contracts should be explored. Currently, there is a CPI clause in most contracts which
allows for an upward adjustment in payments to contractors when the CPI increases. This
means payments to contractors increase during inflationary periods even if gas prices and
other important inputs peculiar to the pupil transportation industry do not increase.
According to the DoE, Little Falls School District is the only school district that has
negotiated fixed contract thus far. Using fixed cost contract, Little Falls is reported to have
saved $24,000 in 2012. In return, Little Falls increases payments to its contractor whenever
the State increases its allocation for pupil transportation budgets. By this, Little Falls is able
to eliminate any burdens due outsourcing. This may be something all outsourcing school
districts need to consider.
There is also the need for districts to engage in some sharing or consolidation of
their transportation needs. Some collaboration between school districts can give them
leverage during contract negotiations. In addition, by collaborating, contractors may be
able to transfer any gains in scale economies to school districts by way of lower contract
bids. School districts are independently managed by a board and there no laws that
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currently force collaboration between these school districts. This means school districts
must be provided the incentive to collaborate. It is well established in the public choice that
government bureaucrats generally have a desire to exercise control over their own budgets.
This desire runs contrary to any desire for collaboration.
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8.0

CONCLUSION

School districts are facing rising deficits, and ever increasing demands in the quality
and number of pupils they produce. Economic theory suggests the use of competitive
outsourcing allows districts to maintain control over policy decisions while controlling
their costs. Despite the widespread ex-ante support, the few studies that examined the pupil
transportation industry present ambiguous empirical evidence. Most studies have been case
studies and cross-sections that fail to control for both unobserved district specific
characteristics, and the endogenous nature of the decision to outsource.

Most of the

datasets used in the past studies have lacked information on the period before the adoption
of outsourcing. Thus the results from these studies cannot be separated into cost differences
due to the adoption of the outsourcing policy and the differences due to some preexisting
differences. One unique feature of the data used in this paper, however, is the fact that a
subsample contained information on both pre- and post-outsourcing adoption. This made it
possible to disentangle differences in costs arising from the adoption of outsourcing from
other factors that may influence costs. A further analysis of the subsample that switched
between in-house and outsourcing further strengthens the results from using the full
sample. In addition, this study controls for the endogeneity of the decision to outsource
through the use of instrumental variables.
Using a sample of 343 school districts over a twelve-year period, I implement a
fixed-effects 2SLS estimation strategy. With the fixed-effects 2SLS, I account for districts‟
47

heterogeneity as well as the endogenous decision to outsource. The use of such a large
dataset, and simultaneously addressing these issues have been absent in the literature on
outsourcing in the pupil transportation industry. The second-stage results from the 2SLS
show that ignoring the endogenous nature of the decision to outsource leads to results that
understate the impact of outsourcing on pupil transportation costs. It is estimated that total
transportation costs will increase by about 21 percent due to outsourcing, while average
cost per pupils is estimated to increase by 15.7 percent. Cost per mile also shows a similar
trend of increasing costs as a result of outsourcing, although the magnitudes here are
relatively small. This study also argues that although all these methods of examining cost
are important, probably an examination of cost which takes into consideration the entire
operations of the school may be more useful. To this end, the burden of outsourcing to the
school district was examined. The results here also show that outsourcing induces an
adjustment of districts‟ discretionary budgets. In particular, this measure shows that
outsourcing have to shift allocations from other discretionary expenditure programs in
order to pay contractors. This examination of transportation costs shows that pupil
outsourcing increases the share of student transportation cost by nearly 2 percent. This
method of examining costs takes into the ever-changing nature of education sector in
Minnesota. The summary statistics in this study shows that school districts experiencing
high costs are more likely to outsource but the regression results do not support the
anticipated cost savings from outsourcing.
One shortcoming of this study is that it did not differentiate between the different
types of contracts that may exist between school districts and contractors. Different clauses
in contracts can yield totally different results even for the same school. This study also
48

argued that districts may care more about outsourcing only when it means sacrificing other
programs. It will be important to explore a theoretical exposition of the rational bureaucrat
who seeks to maximize her budget but constraint also by outsourcing part of that budget.
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Figure 1: Average Costs and Outsourcing per year, 2002-2013
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Table 1: Main Variables
Variable

Definition

Expected Sign

Cost

Total cost of transporting pupils in 2013 dollars

Outsource
Pupils

„1‟ if the buses the served a school district in a given year
were all contractor operated buses, and „0‟ otherwise
Number of pupils transported

Miles

Number of vehicle miles

+

Area

Area of school district in square miles

+

School days

Number of days that school is in session

+

Salary

Salary of transportation staff (in 2013 dollars)

+

Gas price

Average cost of gas at the county level

+

Population

Number of people in the county

+

FTE

Number of full-time equivalent employees
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+/+

+/-

% of districts fully outsourcing

0.4

1000000
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60

Thompson
(2011)

Hutchinson
& Pratt
(2007)

Lazarus &
McCullough
(2005)

Hutchinson
& Pratt
(1999)

Alspaugh
(1996)

Harding
(1990)

Indiana

Ross (1988)

Minnesota
(n = 2011)

(n = 66)

Louisiana

(n = 343)

Minnesota

(n = 91)

Tennessee

(n = 533)

Missouri

(n = 363)

Indiana

(n = 274)

Study area

Author (s)

Crosssection/Panel

Cross-section

Cross-section

Cross-section

Cross-section

Cross-section

Crosssection/Panel
Cross-section

Costs are 10% higher
when is outsourced.

Costs are 16-41% higher
when service is
outsourced.

Outsource (1=fully in-house; 1= mostly in-house; 1= mostly outsourcing; 0=fully
outsourcing); Avg. daily attendance; One-way miles driven; Driver salary; No. of
Large Buses; No. of Small Buses; Population Density; Fuel cost/gallon

Outsource (Proportion of buses operated by a contractor); Students transported;
Mileage; District Size; School days; Miles per student; Metro Area

Costs are 10% higher
when is outsourced.

Costs are 9.9% - 10.4%
higher when service is
outsourced.

Outsource (=1 if some or all buses were contractor owned); Sq. miles in district;
Avg. number of pupils daily transported (ADT); Sq. mi./ADT; Number of schools;
Number of routes; ADT/number of routes; Average route length; Miles/ADT;
Multiple runs dummy (1=multiple runs); Kindergarten routes dummy (1=midday
routes)

Outsource (=1 if some or all buses were contracted); pupils transported; mileage;
wages; fuel costs; number of small buses; number of large school buses; percentage
of students who required specialized transportation services due to a disability; rural
dummy (=1 if school district is in a rural area)

Costs are 15% higher
when service is
outsourced.

Outsource (1= if some or all buses were contractor owned ); number of daily trips
made by buses; Annual inches precipitation in county; Annual payroll; Per capita
income in county; Percentage of population that is nonwhite; Sq. mi. in county; Avg.
earnings of full-time teachers in district; Avg. earnings of other school employees

Costs are 27% lower in 15
districts but 21% higher in
4 districts that outsource

Costs are 5% lower when
service is outsourced.

Outsource (=Proportion of total miles serviced by contractor) Avg. annual cost/trip;
Avg. number of miles/trip; Avg. number of students/trip; Total miles/day; Avg.
number of trips/bus; Avg. year of manufacture of bus;

Outsource (=1 if some or all buses were contractor owned); Avg. daily attendance;
One-way miles driven; Driver salary; No. of Large Buses; No. of Small Buses;
Population Density; Fuel cost/gallon

Result

Independent Variables

Table 3: A Summary of the Most Recent Literature

Table 4: Summary Statistics: Full Sample
Full Sample

In-house

Std

Outsource
Std

Std

Variable

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

Cost

867,331

1,245,540

680,522

1,030,527

1,321,693

1,565,950

Cost per student

474.78

331.60

464.05

368.49

500.88

215.07

Outsource

0.29

0.45

0.00

0.00

1.00

0.00

Students

2450

4745

1983

4191

3585

5722

Schooldays

170.83

3.89

170.68

4.01

171.21

3.53

Area

250.80

347.46

287.35

398.46

161.92

130.81

Pop. Density

260

614.26

212

561

375

716.05

Miles

153,112

306,420

151,133

310,266

157,925

296,948

Pupil-staff ratio

13.02

2.10

12.64

2.14

13.96

1.68

Metro. area

0.17

0.38

0.11

0.32

0.30

0.46

Total Benefits

498,302

998,708

509,087

1,017,215

472,072

952,154

Av. gas price

3.49

0.66

3.53

0.65

2.70

0.65

Observations

3621

2566

1055

Note
1) Pop. density= population density at the county level
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Table 5: Summary Statistics (Switch Subsample)
Full

In-house
Std

Outsource
Std

Std

Variable

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

Mean

Deviation

Cost

991,522

1,050,472

748,082

802,640

1,228,608

1,199,348

Cost per student

528.36

225.70

510.74

226.95

545.52

223.33

Outsource

0.51

0.50

0

0

1

0

Students

2,597

4,452

2,039

4,152

3,140

4,665

Schooldays

171.89

4.00

170.52

4.43

171.26

3.50

Area

186.29

138.63

188.30

121.47

184.34

153.60

Pop.

260

614.26

212

561

375

716.05

Miles

141,017

190,698

155,221

156,857

127,183

217,923

Student-staff ratio

13.35

1.78

13.03

1.76

13.65

1.75

Metro

0.22

0.42

0.1675

0.3737

0.28

0.45

Total Benefits

355,697

691,578

362,657

582,332

348,920

783,900

Av. gas prices

3.51

0.67

3.75

0.54

3.26

0.67

Observations

1055

538

62

516

Table 6: First Stage Regression Results
(1)
Dependent Variable: Outsource
Prior experience
Republican
Log(Pupils)
Schooldays
Log(Pop. Density)
Log(Miles)
Pupil-staff
Log(Wages)
Gas prices
FTE Staff
Constant
Observations
R-squared
Number of id
F-statistic
Stock-Yogo
C-D Wald F
Sargan p-value
LM

(2)
Outsource

(3)
Outsource

(4)
Outsource

0.288***
0.288***
0.279***
0.150***
(0.0290)
(0.0290)
(0.0298)
(0.0178)
0.228***
0.229***
0.240*
0.257*
(0.0173)
(0.0173)
(0.1295)
(0.157)
-0.0237
-0.0210
0.0159
(0.0433)
(0.0460)
(0.0276)
0.00281*
0.00280*
0.00289*
0.00105
(0.00145)
(0.00145)
(0.00149)
(0.000891)
0.0888*** 0.0898***
0.108***
0.103***
(0.0326)
(0.0325)
(0.0334)
(0.0200)
-0.00317
-0.00337
-0.00783**
-0.00309
(0.00361)
(0.00360)
(0.00368)
(0.00221)
-0.00166
-0.00231
0.00165
(0.00440)
(0.00454)
(0.00272)
-0.0457*** -0.0455*** -0.0443***
-0.0120***
(0.00491)
(0.00491)
(0.00504)
(0.00302)
0.0249
-0.0136
0.0622
-0.00305
(0.0659)
(0.0536)
(0.0679)
(0.0407)
-1.61e-05
(0.000199)
-0.218
0.211
-0.904
-0.184
(1.026)
(0.895)
(1.062)
(0.636)
3,620
3,621
3,620
3,620
0.191
0.191
0.148
0.118
343
343
343
343
First stage regression diagnostics for 2SLS
52.95
38.52
28.31
44.49
19.93
19.93
19.93
19.93
133
134.19
43.19
51.31
.855
.35
.31
.48
248.88
249.41
84.63
87.2
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note:
(1) First stage results associated with log total transportation costs as the dependent variable in the second stage .
This is the same first stage results associated with transportation cost-expenditure ratio as the dependent variable.
(2) First stage results associated with log cost per pupil as the dependent variable in the second stage
(3) First stage results associated with log cost per mile as the dependent variable in the second stage
(4) Outsource here is defined as the ratio of buses used by a contractor to total number of buses that served a district
during a year. First stage results here are associated with log total transportation c osts as the dependent variable in
the second stage .
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Table 7: Regression results from log(total transportation cost)

Outsource

(1)-OLS

(2)-OLS

(3)-FE

(4)-2SLS

0.974***
(0.0375)

0.366***
(0.0186)
0.747***
(0.0441)
-0.00543***
(0.00196)
-0.0821***
(0.00630)
0.0356***
(0.00515)
-0.0254***
(0.00383)
-0.0464***
(0.00643)
0.231***
(0.0423)
5.897***
(0.533)
Yes
No
3,620
0.858

0.0945***
(0.0179)
0.158***
(0.0462)
0.00533***
(0.00154)
0.107***
(0.0347)
0.00811**
(0.00381)
-0.0108**
(0.00469)
-0.00703
(0.00526)
0.361***
(0.0700)
5.172***
(1.089)
Yes
Yes
3,620
0.241
343

0.191***
(0.0652)
0.161***
(0.0463)
0.00515***
(0.00156)
0.0971***
(0.0353)
0.00862**
(0.00383)
-0.0106**
(0.00470)
-0.00208
(0.00616)
0.357***
(0.0702)

Log(Pupils)
schooldays
Log(Pop. Density)
Log(Miles)
Pupil-Staff Ratio
Log(Wages)
Gas Price
Constant
Year
District Effects
Observations
R-squared
Num. of Districts

13.04***
(0.0662)
Yes
No
3,621
0.158

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Yes
Yes
3,620
0.234
343

Table 8: Regression results from log (Cost Per Pupil)
(1)-OLS
(2)-OLS
(3)-FE
Outsource

0.255***
(0.0184)

0.343***
(0.0191)
-0.00379*
(0.00202)
-0.0958***
(0.00634)
0.0318***
(0.00528)
-0.000110***
(3.58e-05)
-0.0437***
(0.00663)
-0.0271**
(0.0126)
7.870***
(0.399)
Yes
No
3,621
0.258

0.104***
(0.0194)
Schooldays
0.00521***
(0.00167)
Log(Pop. Density)
0.116***
(0.0375)
Log(Miles)
0.00414
(0.00412)
Staff
0.000359
(0.000230)
Log(Wages)
-0.00475
(0.00569)
Gas Prices
-0.567***
(0.0616)
Constant
6.129***
14.00***
(0.0310)
(1.029)
Year
Yes
Yes
District Effects
No
Yes
Observations
3,621
3,621
R-squared
0.085
0.151
Number of Districts
343
Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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(4)-2SLS
0.146**
(0.0696)
0.00483***
(0.00166)
0.0863**
(0.0377)
0.00474
(0.00409)
0.000348
(0.000227)
0.00134
(0.00657)
-0.568***
(0.0609)

Yes
Yes
3,621
0.147
343

Table 9: Regression results from log(Cost per mile) and Transport cost-expenditure ratio
Dependent
variable:
Outsource
Log(Students)
Schooldays
Log(Pop.
Density)
Students-Staff
Ratio
Log(Wages)
Gas Prices

(1)
Log(cost per
mile)

(2)-2SLS
Log(cost per
mile)

(3)
Cost-Expenditure
Ratio

(4)-2SLS
Cost-Expenditure
Ratio

0.0300**
(0.0138)
-0.0722**
(0.0354)
-0.00241**
(0.00118)
-0.0874***

0.0507***
(0.00999)
-0.0571
(0.0414)
-0.00380***
(0.00141)
-0.138***

0.0092***
(0.000879)
0.00547**
(0.00226)
0.000315***
(7.56e-05)
0.00981***

0.0191***
(0.00548)
0.00578**
(0.00231)
0.000286***
(7.84e-05)
0.00876***

(0.0266)
0.00992***

(0.0328)
0.0111***

(0.00170)
-0.000252

(0.00182)
-0.000230

(0.00359)
-0.00960**
(0.00404)
-0.143***
(0.0537)

(0.00420)
0.0147**
(0.00688)
-0.161**
(0.0628)

(0.000234)
-0.000629*
(0.000380)
-0.0345***
(0.00350)
0.000380**
(0.000192)

3.939***
(0.834)
Yes
Yes
3,620
0.459
343

Yes
Yes
3,620
0.260
343

(0.000230)
-0.00114***
(0.000258)
-0.0342***
(0.00343)
0.000326*
(0.000187)
0.495***
(0.0534)
Yes
Yes
3,620
0.274
343

Log(Miles)
Constant
Year
District Effects
Observations
R-squared
Number of
districts

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Yes
Yes
3,620
0.224
343

APPENDIX B: 2SLS-FE REGRESSION RESULTS WITH A CONTINUOUS
OUTSOURCING VARIABLE
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Table 10: 2SLS-FE Regression results with a continuous outsourcing variable

Outsource
Log(Students)

School days

Log(Pop. Density)
Log(Miles)

Student-staff

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

Log(cost)

Log(cost per

Log (cost per

Cost-expenditure

student)

mile)

ratio

0.378*

0.285

0.0910***

0.0357***

(0.198)

(0.196)

(0.191)

(0.00972)

0.153***

-0.0778*

0.00500**

(0.0451)

(0.0431)

(0.00221)

0.00520***

0.00495***

-0.00328**

0.000304***

(0.00152)

(0.00166)

(0.00145)

(7.46e-05)

0.0788**

0.0731*

-0.177***

0.00713***

(0.0394)

(0.0419)

(0.0378)

(0.00193)

0.00827**

0.00439

0.000341*

(0.00374)

(0.00408)

(0.000184)

-0.0117**

0.00818*

-0.000340

(0.00459)

(0.00439)

(0.000226)

FTE Staff

0.00032
(0.00023)

Log(Wages)

-0.00600

-0.00162

0.00295

-0.00105***

(0.00591)

(0.00632)

(0.00567)

(0.000290)

Observations

3,620

3,621

3,620

3,620

R-squared

0.271

0.151

0.195

0.281

343

343

343

343

Number of districts

Standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Note: The outsourcing variable here is defined as the ratio of contractor-operated buses to the total
number of buses serving a school district during the school year.
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APPENDIX C: SCHOOL DISTRICTS DATA USED IN THIS STUDY
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County Name

School District

Brown County

New Ulm

Aitkin County

Mcgregor

Carlton County

Cloquet

Aitkin County

Hill City

Carlton County

Esko

Aitkin County

Aitkin

Carlton County

Carlton

Anoka County

St. Francis

Carlton County

Wrenshall

Anoka County

Spring Lake Park

Carlton County

Cromwell

Anoka County

Centennial

Carlton County

Barnum

Anoka County

Columbia Heights

Carlton County

Moose Lake

Anoka County

Anoka-Hennepin

Carver County

Norwood

Anoka County

Fridley

Carver County

Waconia

Becker County

Detroit Lakes

Carver County

Watertown-Mayer

Becker County

Lake Park Audubo

Carver County

Chaska

Becker County

Pine Point

Cass County

Northland Commun

Becker County

Frazee

Cass County

Pillager

Beltrami County

Red Lake

Cass County

Pine River-Backu

Beltrami County

Bemidji

Cass County

Walker-Hackensac

Beltrami County

Blackduck

Cass County

Cass Lake-Bena S

Beltrami County

Kelliher

Chippewa County

Montevideo

Benton County

Sauk Rapids

Chippewa County

M.A.C.C.R.A.Y.

Benton County

Foley

Chisago County

Rush City

Big Stone County

Ortonville

Chisago County

North Branch

Big Stone County

Clinton-Gracevil

Chisago County

Chisago Lakes

Blue Earth County

St. Clair

Chisago County

Franconia

Blue Earth County

Mankato

Clay County

Moorhead

Blue Earth County

Maple River

Clay County

Ulen-Hitterdal

Blue Earth County

Lake Crystal-Wel

Clay County

Hawley

Brown County

Sleepy Eye

Clay County

Dilworth-Glyndon

Brown County

Springfield

Clay County

Barnesville

Brown County

Comfrey

Clearwater County

Bagley
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Clearwater County

Clearbrook-Gonvi

Fillmore County

Kingsland

Cook County

Cook County

Fillmore County

Lanesboro

Cottonwood Count.

Red Rock Central

Freeborn County

Alden

Cottonwood Count

Windom

Freeborn County

Glenville-Emmons

Cottonwood Count

Mountain Lake

Freeborn County

Albert Lea

Cottonwood Count

Westbrook-Walnut

Goodhue County

Red Wing

Crow Wing County

Crosby-Ironton

Goodhue County

Kenyon-Wanamingo

Crow Wing County

Brainerd

Goodhue County

Pine Island

Crow Wing County

Pequot Lakes

Goodhue County

Goodhue

Dakota County

Farmington

Goodhue County

Cannon Falls

Dakota County

Burnsville

Grant County

Herman-Norcross

Dakota County

Inver Grove

Grant County

West Central Are

Dakota County

West St. Paul-Me

Grant County

Ashby

Dakota County

Lakeville

Hennepin County

Richfield

Dakota County

South St. Paul

Hennepin County

Bloomington

Dakota County

Randolph

Hennepin County

Westonka

Dakota County

Hastings

Hennepin County

Robbinsdale

Dakota County

Rosemount-Apple

Hennepin County

Brooklyn Center

Dodge County

Hayfield

Hennepin County

Hopkins

Dodge County

Triton

Hennepin County

Osseo

Dodge County

Kasson-Mantorvil

Hennepin County

Eden Prairie

Douglas County

Alexandria

Hennepin County

Wayzata

Douglas County

Evansville

Hennepin County

Minneapolis

Douglas County

Brandon

Hennepin County

Orono

Douglas County

Osakis

Hennepin County

Edina

Faribault County

Blue Earth Area

Hennepin County

St. Anthony-New

Faribault County

United South Cen

Hennepin County

Minnetonka

Fillmore County

Fillmore Central

Hennepin County

St. Louis Park

Fillmore County

Rushford-Peterso

Houston County

Lacrescent-Hokah

Fillmore County

Mabel-Canton

Houston County

Caledonia
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Houston County

Spring Grove

Le Sueur County

Waterville-Elysi

Houston County

Houston

Le Sueur County

Cleveland

Hubbard County

Nevis

Le Sueur County

Lecenter

Hubbard County

Laporte

Le Sueur County

Montgomery-Lonsd

Hubbard County

Park Rapids

Le Sueur County

Lesueur-Henderso

Isanti County

Cambridge-Isanti

Lincoln County

Hendricks

Isanti County

Braham

Lincoln County

Ivanhoe

Itasca County

Deer River

Lincoln County

Lake Benton

Itasca County

Greenway

Lincoln County

Rtr Public Schools

Itasca County

Grand Rapids

Lincoln County

Tyler

Itasca County

Nashwauk-Keewati

Lyon County

Tracy

Jackson County

Jackson County C

Lyon County

Lakeview

Jackson County

Heron Lake-Okabe

Lyon County

Minneota

Kanabec County

Mora School District

Lyon County

Balaton

Kanabec County

Ogilvie School
District

Lyon County

Lynd

Lyon County

Marshall

Kandiyohi County

New London-Spice
Lyon County

Russell

Kandiyohi County

Willmar
Mcleod County

Hutchinson

Kittson County

Kittson Central
Mcleod County

Mcleod West Scho

Mcleod County

Glencoe-Silver L

Mcleod County

Lester Prairie

Mahnomen County

Mahnomen

Mahnomen County

Waubun

Marshall County

Stephen-Argyle C

Kittson County

Lancaster

Kittson County

Tri-County

Koochiching

International Fa

Koochiching

Littlefork-Big F

Koochiching
County

South Koochichin

Lac Qui Parle

Bellingham

Marshall County

Grygla

Lac Qui Parle

Dawson-Boyd

Marshall County

Marshall County

Lac Qui Parle

Lac Qui Parle Va

Marshall County

Warren-Alvarado-

Lake County

Lake Superior

Martin County

Martin County We

Lake of the Woods
County

Lake Of The Wood

Martin County

Fairmont Area Sc

Martin County

Granada Huntley-
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Martin County

Truman

Norman County

Ada-Borup

Meeker County

Dassel-Cokato

Olmsted County

Byron

Meeker County

Litchfield

Olmsted County

Chatfield

Meeker County

A.C.G.C.

Olmsted County

Rochester

Meeker County

Eden Valley-Watk

Olmsted County

Dover-Eyota

Mille Lacs County

Milaca

Olmsted County

Stewartville

Mille Lacs County

Isle

Otter Tail County

Underwood

Mille Lacs County

Princeton

Otter Tail County

Battle Lake

Mille Lacs County

Onamia

Otter Tail County

Fergus Falls

Morrison County

Pierz

Otter Tail County

Parkers Prairie

Morrison County

Upsala

Otter Tail County

Perham

Morrison County

Royalton

Otter Tail County

Henning

Morrison County

Little Falls

Otter Tail County

Pelican Rapids

Morrison County

Swanville

Otter Tail County

New York Mills

Mower County

Lyle

Pennington County

Thief River Fall

Mower County

Austin

Pennington County

Goodridge

Mower County

Grand Meadow

Pine County

Willow River

Mower County

Southland

Pine County

Pine City

Mower County

Leroy

Pine County

Hinckley-Finlays

Murray County

Fulda

Pine County

East Central

Murray County

Murray County Ce

Pipestone County

Pipestone-Jasper

Nicollet County

St. Peter

Pipestone County

Ruthton

Nicollet County

Nicollet

Pipestone County

Edgerton

Nobles County

Adrian

Polk County

Fertile-Beltrami

Nobles County

Brewster

Polk County

Fosston

Nobles County

Worthington

Polk County

Win-E-Mac

Nobles County

Ellsworth

Polk County

Crookston

Nobles County

Round Lake

Polk County

Climax

Norman County

Norman County Ea

Polk County

East Grand Forks

Norman County

Norman County We

Polk County

Fisher School District
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Pope County

Cyrus

Nett Lake

Nett Lake

Pope County

Minnewaska

St. Louis County

Duluth

Ramsey County

St. Paul

St. Louis County

Eveleth-Gilbert

Ramsey County

White Bear Lake

St. Louis County

Chisholm

Ramsey County

Roseville

St. Louis County

Hibbing

Ramsey County

North St Paul-Ma

St. Louis County

Ely

Ramsey County

Mounds View

St. Louis County

Floodwood

Red Lake County

Oklee

St. Louis County

Mountain Iron-Bu

Red Lake County

Red Lake Falls

Scott County

Jordan

Red Lake County

Plummer

Scott County

New Prague

Redwood County

Redwood Falls Ar

Scott County

Prior Lake

Redwood County

Wabasso

Scott County

Shakopee

Redwood County

Cedar Mountain

Scott County

Belle Plaine

Redwood County

Milroy

Sherburne County

Becker

Renville County

Buffalo Lake-Hec

Sherburne County

Big Lake

Renville County

Renville County

Sherburne County

Elk River

Renville County

Bird Island-Oliv

Sibley County

Sibley East

Rice County

Northfield

Sibley County

G.F.W.

Rice County

Faribault

Stearns County

Sauk Centre

Rock County

Hills-Beaver Cre

Stearns County

Paynesville

Rock County

Luverne

Stearns County

Kimball

Roseau County

Roseau

Stearns County

Sartell

Roseau County

Greenbush-Middle

Stearns County

Rocori

Roseau County

Badger

Stearns County

Melrose

Roseau County

Warroad

Stearns County

Belgrade-Brooten

St. Louis County

Proctor

Stearns County

St. Cloud

St. Louis County

Mesabi East

Stearns County

Holdingford

St. Louis County

Virginia

Stearns County

Albany

St. Louis County

Hermantown

Steele County

Medford

St. Louis County

St. Louis County

Steele County

Blooming Prairie
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Steele County

Owatonna

County

Stevens County

Hancock

Washington
County

Mahtomedi

Stevens County

Chokio-Alberta
Morris

Washington
County

Forest Lake

Stevens County
Swift County

Benson

Stillwater

Swift County

Kerkhoven-Murdoc

Washington
County

Todd County

Bertha-Hewitt

Watonwan County

Butterfield

Todd County

Long Prairie-Gre

Watonwan County

Madelia

Todd County

Staples-Motley

Watonwan County

St. James

Todd County

Eagle Valley

Wilkin County

Breckenridge

Todd County

Browerville

Wilkin County

Campbell-Tintah

Traverse County

Browns Valley

Wilkin County

Rothsay

Traverse County

Wheaton Area Sch

Winona County

Lewiston-Altura

Wabasha County

Lake City

Winona County

St. Charles

Wabasha County

Elgin-Millville

Winona County

Winona Area Publ

Wabasha County

Plainview

Wright County

Rockford

Wabasha County

Zumbrota-Mazeppa

Wright County

Annandale

Wabasha County

Wabasha-Kellogg

Wright County

Howard Lake-Wave

Wadena County

Wadena-Deer Cree

Wright County

Delano

Wadena County

Verndale

Wright County

St. Michael-Albe

Wadena County

Menahga

Wright County

Maple Lake

Wadena County

Sebeka

Wright County

Buffalo

Waseca County

N.R.H.E.G.

Wright County

Monticello

Waseca County

Waseca

Yellow Med. Count

Canby

Waseca County

Janesville-Waldo

Yellow Med. Count

Yellow Medicine

Washington

South Washington
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